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DEPRECIATION OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED SUBJECT TO A
LEASE: PREMIUM LEASE RENTALS AS A WASTING ASSET
W. REED QUILLIAM, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Pity the tax lawyer through the years
Who I'm certain must have been close to tears'
Representing a client who acquired a piece
Of real estate subject to an existing lease.
After Friend2 I suppose he'd have had to plead
(Since the Code must not say what I can read)
That inheritance gives you a basis for trading
But nary a one for depreciating.
And that lucrative lease contract that you buy
That is melting away like pie in the sky
Is nothing, the Tax Court would have us to see
But merely an incident of the fee.
And so on ....
If the above represents a dismal effort at verse, it is scarcely more
lamentable than the efforts of the courts have been in dealing with the
tax consequences to the purchaser, heir or devisee of property acquired
subject to a lease. If the foregoing rhyme is lacking in meter and style, it
is ringing with truth.
Before inspecting the judicial treatment of such acquisitions, it is
necessary to examine three hypothetical cases presenting facts similar to
those typically dealt with by the courts. After contemplating the nature of
the problem, the generally aberrant determination yielded by the courts
can be examined in their proper perspective.
Unimproved Land
In hypothetical Case 1' C has purchased land which if not leased
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
1. See notes 98-109 supra and accompanying text for the plight of the taxpayer's
attorney in Rowan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
2. Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673
(1941).
3. See Appendix. The numbered cases referred to in the remainder of the article
are listed in the Appendix. Factual assumptions and numerical calculations are provided
for each hypothetical case.
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would presently be worth $80,000 and which could be expected to bring
a return of $4,800 annually at present market rates. But the property
is leased for forty more years and will return $6,000 annually during
this period. Assume that C is a prudent and experienced investor and
prior to making the purchase assessed the worth of the land. He found
the present value of expectant lease rentals, discounting them at a rate
appropriate to the risk of the investment, to be $90,277. He evaluated the
reversionary interest in the land, based upon its value at acquisition' and
discounting at a rate appropriate to the risk, at $7,777. Thus, knowing the
value of A's property to be $98,054 and recognizing A to be an equally
skilled trader, C offers that amount to A and it is accepted.
Has C acquired any assets which should be depreciable under the
Code ?' Regarding the nature of the depreciation deduction the Supreme
Court has said:
The end and purpose of it all is to approximate and reflect
the financial consequences to the taxpayer of the subtle effects
of time and use on the value of its capital assets. For this purpose
it is sound accounting practice annually to accrue as to each
classification of depreciable property an amount which at the
time is retired will with its salvage value replace the original
investment therein.6
At the expiration of the lease C will have an asset-the unencumbered
land-presumably worth $80,000.' Thus, his capital investment of
$98,054 will decline in value by $18,054 during the lease term. The
"wasting" should be reflected by an annual depreciation deduction from
C's gross income during the term of the lease.
C is investing not only in land, including its natural attribute-the
right to receive an annual fair rental value of $4,800-but he is also
investing in the contractual right to receive an additional $1,200 per year
4. In determining the present value of the reversionary interest in the land, it
seems clear that the land's fair market value at the time of acquisition should be assigned
as the value of the land at the termination of the lease, without consideration of possible
changes in the land values. This is in accord with common sense, since the current value
presumably reflects the contingency of change, and is consistent with present tax policy
which, in allocating basis in proportion to values, looks solely to present value without
considering future fluctuations resulting from economic factors.
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167(a):
(a) GENERAL RULE-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
6. Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
7. See note 4 supra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/2
DEPRECIATION SUBJECT TO A LEASE
in rentals. The latter asset, for which C is paying $18,054, will be
exhausted during the lease term, and a depreciation deduction would
simply represent a return of capital to C. It seems clear that of C's total
basis of $98,054, $18,054 would be depreciable over the lease term. Since
the Code' limits depreciation of intangible property to the straight line
method, the amount should be amortized evenly throughout the lease's
duration. Permitting depreciation of this contractual right is not unusual.
In addition to the Regulations' specifically providing for the deprecia-
tion of intangibles, depreciation has consistently been allowed on a
variety of exhaustible contract rights.
If C paid either more or less than the actual value of $98,054 for the
assets, the depreciable portion of this purchase price should be determined
in accordance with the Treasury Regulation"° which establishes the
formula for apportioning the basis between depreciable and nondepreci-
able assets. 1
Improved Land-Improvements Built by Lessee
In Case 712 the existence of a lessee-built structure is of no economic
significance to C. The building can not generate any rental income for
C's benefit and since the useful life of the improvement is shorter than the
lease term, C has no reversionary interest in the building. The rentals
under the lease represent nothing more than ground rent to A, even after
the improvements were constructed, and they remain ground rent in the
hands of C. A had no economic interest in the building and neither does
his purchaser.
Whether legal title to the building is in B or C is of no importance
for tax purposes since the Code requires that the property be held "for
the production of income"" in order to qualify for the depreciation
deduction. Since the rentals are being paid for the land alone, the building
clearly does not meet this criterion. What is C's investment? As in Case
1, he is buying land, including the right to receive the fair rental value
thereof and the premium value provided by the lease contract over and
above the fair rental value of the land. It is not reasonable to assume that
8. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 167(c).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1967).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1967) provides that the basis for the depreciable
property
cannot exceed an amount which bears the same proportion to the lump sum as
the value of the depreciable property at the time of acquisition bears to the value
of the entire property at that time.
11. Several examples of allocation under Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-S (1967) are pro-
vided in Case 1, Columns G, H and I.
12. See Appendix.
13. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167(a).
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any portion of the purchase price is being paid for a building with a
useful life"4 shorter than the lease term and which is not producing
rentals during the term. The building represents nothing more than
security for payment of the ground rent to C. Though the security may
add value to the lease contract" it clearly does not qualify as a separate,
depreciable item of acquisition.
Thus, the tax treatment of C should be the same in Case 7 as in
Case 1. He should be permitted to amortize that portion of his basis
allocable to the premium rentals-the exhausted fraction of his basis.
Consequently, depreciation on the building should not be allowed.
Property Acquired from a Decedent
Case 6"6 presents facts similar to Case 1 except that C acquired the
property from A by inheritance rather than by purchase. Thus, there is no
purchase price by which to measure C'.s investment in the wasting asset.
The Code'" provides that the basis for depreciation shall be the same as
that for determining gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of
property. Section 101418 states that the basis of property acquired from
a decedent shall be the fair market value of the property at the decedent's
death.'" Accordingly, the property acquires its basis by the incidence of
the estate tax.2" Assuming that the estate tax return correctly reflected a
property value of $98,054," C has manifestly acquired the decedent's
basis in the property. A depreciation deduction will be allowed for that
portion of the basis, $18,054, allocable to the wasting premium value of
the lease.
It is apparent that the tax treatment of C in all three hypotheticals
should be the same. The existence of lessee-built improvements, with a
useful life shorter than the lease term, should not affect C's tax treat-
ment because C has no economic interest in the depreciable improvements
and does not hold them for the production of income. Regardless, C has a
14. It is the useful life of the building to C at the time of his purchase that should
be measured, not the useful life allocated to the building by B. If the reasonably ex-
pected useful life at the time of purchase exceeds the remaining term of the lease, a por-
tion of the purchase price is attributable to the building. See notes 126-28 infra and ac-
companying text.
15. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
16. See Appendix.
17. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167(g).
18. Id. at § 1014.
19. "[I]n the case of an election under either section 2032 or section 811(j)
[the value will be that] prescribed under those sections." Id. at (a).
20. Currier v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
21. An interesting problem is presented where the decedent's estate tax return
valued the property at either more or less than its actual fair market value as determined
by the court in the proceedings pertaining to depreciation. This problem is discussed in
notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text.
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depreciable interest in the premium rentals. That C acquired his basis
by inheritance rather than purchase is superfluous insofar as his right to
depreciation is concerned, since the Code makes it clear that the basis for
depreciation of property acquired from a decedent shall be the fair market
value of the property at the date of the decedent's death.
JUDICIAL ERRANCY
The foregoing hypothetical cases were considered to illustrate that
C's tax treatment should be the same whether the land is unimproved,
improved by a lessee-built structure with a useful life shorter than the
lease term or whether C's basis was acquired through purchase or
inheritance. The majority of cases considered involve land subject to a
lease extending beyond the life of a lessee-constructed building. The
following discussion attempts to analyze the generally errant judicial
treatment accorded the legal questions presented by these hypothetical
cases.
Inherited Basis
An earlier obstacle to the proper disposition of inheritance cases
was Friend v. Commissioner,2 the first case directly dealing with the
tax consequences accorded one acquiring lessee-improved property subject
to a long term lease. Though the Board of Tax Appeals had denied
amortization of lease rentals on other grounds,22 the circuit court, in
affirming, held that the taxpayer had acquired no depreciable basis by
virtue of inheriting the property.24 This obviously erroneous interpreta-
tion of the statute was ignored by the Tax Court. In Currier v. Com-
missioner," however, the court observed:
The basis of inherited property is not cost. . . . The basis of
property acquired by devise is categorically fixed by statute as
fair market value on the date of aquisition .... Having acquired
a basis of the incidence of the estate tax, the gradually dis-
appearing value of a wasting asset can not be replaced except by
periodic depreciation deductions."'
Although Currier was not appealed, the Tax Court's diagnosis of
22. 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941).
23. Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939).
24. The court stated:
It is plain from a reading of the statute that what is meant is to give the asset
a basis for . . . determining gain or loss. . . . The statute can not be
construed . . . to place the petitioners in the position of a purchaser .
Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1941).
25. 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
26. Id. at 984.
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the problem was approved by the Fifth Circuit in Commissioner v.
Pearson,27 the next inheritance case presented. Subsequent decisions
have denied depreciation on lessee-constructed improvements acquired by
inheritance; however, they have not taken the Friend approach that a
depreciable basis cannot be inherited. Rather, they are grounded in the
concept that the property acquired by inheritance does not include, for
tax purposes, the lessee-built structure in which neither the heir nor his
ancestor had any economic interest. Regardless, it is not entirely clear that
an heir and a purchaser will be accorded similar treatment by the courts.
This peculiarity arises as a result of the Eighth Circuit's decision in
World Publishing Company v. Commissioner." In the face of an
established line of inheritance cases denying depreciation of a lessee-
constructed building with a life shorter than the lease, the court, in
allowing such depreciation in a purchase case, stated:
Whatever may be the proper result in the inheritance, or
devise situation . . . we are not now willing to extend the
philosophy of those cases to the purchase situation of the present
case.
29
An interesting variable to the inheritance situation is suggested by the
facts of Pearson. What if the valuation placed upon the property in the
decedent's tax return does not accurately reflect the fair market value of
the property as determined by the court in the proceedings concerning
the claim for depreciation?
In a purchase situation, such as Case 1, if C pays $85,000 for pro-
perty with a total value of $98,054, it is reasonable to assume that he got
a "good buy" on both the land and the premium rentals and thus, he
should be permitted to allocate his basis between them at the same ratio
that each of them bears to total value. But in an inheritance case where
C's basis is established solely by the imposition of the estate tax, there
would seem to be some justification, in a proceeding to determine C's
right to a depreciation deduction, for permitting C to allocate that
amount to the wasting asset upon which estate tax was paid and which is
in excess of the fair market value of the land, but not exceeding the
27. 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
28. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
29. Id. at 622. Though the court did not attempt to distinguish the purchase situa-
tion from the inheritance situation by questioning the statutory basis for depreciation ac-
corded to an heir, there is no other reasonable basis for distinction and the quoted
language at least raises the implication that the court finds some distinction to exist. As
a result of this decision, the present state of the law is probably that a purchaser can
depreciate the lessee-built structure, while an heir cannot. See 4 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 23.90 (1966).
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total fair market value. The estate tax valuation in excess of the fair
market value would be allocated in the normal manner. Thus, if the total
fair market value in Case 6 was $98,054, but A's estate tax return
reflected a value of $80,000-the value of the land alone-a depreciation
deduction would not be permitted; if the valuation was $85,000, he would
be allowed to allocate $5,000 to the wasting asset. If the estate tax valua-
tion is in excess of its fair market value, for example, $105,000, the alloca-
tion to the wasting asset would be determined by assigning the same pro-
portion to the valuation that the depreciable value bears to the total value,
$19,320.0 It would seem that the reduced allocations to the depreciable
assets could be made under the Regulations"' by virtue of the pronounce-
ment therein that the depreciable basis can not exceed the amount pro-
vided by the formula. Of course, if the estate tax proceeding could be
reopened and adjusted to reflect the true fair market value of the
property, depreciation should be allowed on the depreciable portion of
that value.
There should not be a distinction in the tax treatment accorded C
whether he is a purchaser or an heir. The World Publishing decision is
erroneous if it is to be construed as advocating a variance in treatment.
The Currier approach should be followed except when the decedent's
estate tax return does not reflect the true fair market value of the property
as found by the court in the proceeding on the claim for depreciation.
"Incident to the Fee" Doctrine
A maxim initiated by the Board of Tax Appeals in Friend has been
a consistent hindrance to the proper adjudication of these cases. In
Friend the taxpayer had inherited property under facts approximating
Case 7. In denying the taxpayer amortization of any portion of the lease
rentals, the court adopted the position that the right to rentals was
merely a feature of the fee simple title. The court stated: "In a fee simple
title all lesser estates, rights, titles and interests merge.""2
If the "incident to the fee" doctrine was conceived in Friend, it was
injected into the terminology of these cases in Peters v. Commissioner,"
when the Tax Court held:
[The petitioner] did not acquire as a separate and distinct
item of property the right to receive rental income; she,
30. Alternate treatment of this type is parenthetically proposed in Case 6, Columns
H and I.
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1967).
32. Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768, 771 (1939).
33. 4 T.C. 1236 (1945).
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acquired this right as a part of the bundle of rights incident
to the ownership of the fee. "
Since that decision the Tax Court has consistently denied deprecia-
tion or amortization of the premium value of lease rentals in these cases
and, in all but one,"' has based its denial on the "incident to the fee"
doctrine.8" Its last two decisions have denied recovery 7 despite circuit
court reversals of two earlier Tax Court judgments."8
At least on occasion, however, the courts of appeal have challenged
the Tax Court's dogmatism on this point. The first challenge occurred in
Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner" where the lessee who
built the improvements4" purchased the fee to escape the excessive
rentals. The building's useful life was shorter than the lease term. The
value of the land was only $200,000, yet the taxpayer agreed to a
purchase price of $441,250. Thus, he was apparently paying a substantial
portion of the purchase price for the premium or excess rentals provided
by the lease. The Tax Court denied a deduction based upon the "incident
to the fee" doctrine. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit stated:
If numerous admonitions that taxation is a practical
matter, that taxing authorities may look through form to sub-
stance, is not mere rhetoric where the taxpayer's interest is in-
volved, and a working formula only when it is of advantage to the
Treasury, it would seem to be clear that petitioner paid all over
$200,000 to escape from a burdensome lease, and should be
able to write that off as an expense of doing business.4
Though the court weakens the force of its decision by observing that
"[t]he status of petitioner does not approximate that of a third person
34. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
35. Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954). The Tax Court's denial of
amortization was founded on a lack of proof that any premium values existed in the
lease rentals.
36. World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 7 (1960); Schubert v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960) ; Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950) ; Cleveland
Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 435 (1947); Annex Corp.
v. Commissioner, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Men. 167 (1943).
37. World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 7 (1960); Schubert v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960).
38. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
942 (1954); Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.
1948).
39. 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948).
40. The improvements were actually constructed by an assignee of the original
lessee.
41. Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir.
1948) (emphasis added).
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investor," 2 this case is the first illuminating discourse on the matter.
Few others have followed.
After the Tax Court had denied amortization of premium rentals in
Moore v. Commissioner,"' again on the "incident to the fee" doctrine,
a well-reasoned analysis of the problem was presented." The author
argued that allocating the portion of lease rentals attributable to the fair
market value of the land at the time of purchase-the fair rental value-
fully satisfied the "incident to the fee" doctrine and that rentals in excess
of that allocation should be fully depreciable as a wasting asset.
Perhaps influenced by this article, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's decision in Commissioner v. Moore." The opinion of
Justice Pope remains the most enlightened judicial treatment of the
subject.
In Moore the taxpayer had inherited a one-half interest in property
subject to a lease with a remaining term of eighty-five years. The existing
building had been constructed by the lessee, and its useful life was shorter
than the lease term. Annual rentals attributed to C's half interest were
$120,000, yet the fair market value of her interest in the land, unen-
cumbered by the lease, was only $400,000 at the time of her acquisition
and the fair rental value thereof was $24,000 per year. Thus, it would
appear that the lease had an annual premium value of $96,000.6
At that time the Tax Court was in the midst of a series of cases47
42. Id. at 806.
43. 15 T.C. 906 (1950).
44. Rubin, Depreciation of Property Purchased Subject to a Lease, 65 Hav. L. REv.
1134 (1952).
45. 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 24
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 726 (1955).
46. In Moore, the Ninth Circuit explained the great difference in rental value of
the property at periods in time only fourteen years apart:
Some of the witnesses who testified as to the "favorable" character of the
leases . . . attributed the falling off of rentals since the lease was made, to the
movement of merchandising business away from downtown Los Angeles, and out
into other sections of the city where trading centers had sprung up, where more
room was available for parking facilities and where other types of store build-
ings could be erected.
207 F.2d at 277.
On remand, the Tax Court expanded on the cause of the decreased rentals:
On October 1, 1924, when [the property was leased] . . . Los Angeles was in
the midst of a real estate boom. There had been particular activity during 1923
and 1924 in the area where this property was located. It appeared, at that time,
that this area would become the center of a higher class trade than the downtown
Broadway section. However, the business depression affected this area more
drastically than it did most of the downtown sections. Almost all of the fine
shops moved out and the effort to establish it as an exclusive shopping area
failed.
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 727.
47. See notes 89-92 infra and accompanying text.
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allowing depreciation of the fair market value of buildings at the time of
acquisition and denying depreciation or amortization of any portion of
the lease contract. Moore was decided accordingly, and both the taxpayer
and the Commissioner appealed. Regarding the amortization of the
premium lease rentals, the court of appeals, in reversing both counts,
stated:
Now, if we were dealing with a taxpayer who . . . purchased
... the.., property.., and if it appeared that at that time the
rents being paid were in excess of the fair market rental of the
property. . . it must have included a bonus or premium for the
aquisition of the "favorable" features of the lease .... [S]o it
may be possible to prove that the higher rents secured through
the premium paid by such a purchaser would be exhausted and
terminated when the lease ends . . . . The lease, or rather the
portion thereof providing the above-normal rents, is an in-
tangible asset with a definitely limited life. . . . In our hypo-
thetical case of a . . . purchaser of this . . . interest, if the pre-
mium paid on account of the higher rents to be received under
the lease may not be amortized by deductions over the period of
the lease, his original investment will not be replaced as [the
Code] contemplates....
Here, of course, the taxpayer is not a purchaser, but an heir.
But the effect of . . . the Code is to put the heir in the same
position as if he were a purchaser. ....
Thus we hold that if the lease was one whose favorable
rentals are subject to ultimate exhaustion, that portion of the
.. . [estate tax valuation of the property as a whole] attribut-
able to what we.. . call, for want of a better term, its "premium"
value, should be amortized through annual deductions allowable
to the lessor.4"
In remanding for the Tax Court's determination of the lease's premium
value, the court issued these instructions:
Should this be found to be a conclusion justified by the facts,
the "premium", or sum representing the favorable features of
the lease might be found to be the difference between the value
of the land and the capitalized value of the rents reasonably to
be expected under the lease.49
48. 207 F.2d at 274-76 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 277 (footnotes omitted).
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On remand the Tax Court found that the fair market value of the
land at the time of the taxpayer's acquisition by inheritance was $400,000
and the premium value of lease rentals was $1,000,000. But, instead of
applying the allocation formula provided by the Regulations" and per-
mitting her to depreciate a portion of her basis,5' the court simply per-
mitted the taxpayer to depreciate the $1,000,000 fair market value of the
premium rentals.52 An important aspect in determining the premium value
of the lease rentals was suggested by the circuit court in Moore and was
apparently followed by the Tax Court on remand. An examination of
additional hypothetical cases illustrates this point.
In Case 35" the market value of the land was $100,000 when the
lease was executed ten years earlier and had not increased at the time of
C's purchase. Because the annual rate of return on unimproved land has
decreased from six percent to five percent, the rents to be received under
the lease should be discounted at five percent to determine their present
value since this is the rate of return that C could make in an investment
of a similar risk. Thus, the lease rentals have a premium value because
they provide a higher rate of return than would be obtainable from the
unencumbered land at the time of purchase. Put another way, the lease
provides $1,000 in annual rentals over and above the income that could
be obtained from the property if it were unencumbered at the time of
purchase.
As illustrated by Case 4,54 if the market rate of return had risen to
seven percent the lease would be unfavorable5" and would have no
premium value. Obviously, the lease is not a typical one that should be
evaluated solely on the existing market return of unencumbered land.
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1967).
51. The portion of the taxpayer's basis which she attempted to depreciate bore the
same ratio to the total basis as did the value of the depreciable property ($1,000,000) to
the total value ($1,400,000). The taxpayer's one-half interest in the property had been
valued in her ancestor's estate at $1,000,000.
52. In Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.
1948), that court also failed to apply the allocation formula provided by the Regulations.
There it found the fair market value of the land at $200,000, and allowed taxpayer to
deduct all of the purchase price ($441,250) in excess of that amount. It should have
found the fair market value of the excess or premium rentals and permitted a deduction
of that part of the $441,250 which bore the same ratio to total basis as the value of the
depreciable property bore to total value.
In Moore, it would appear from the facts that the total value of the property ac-
quired exceeded the valuation shown in decedent's estate tax return of $1,533,000. It is
at least arguable that in such a situation the taxpayer-heir should be limited, in his al-
location of basis to the wasting asset, to that amount upon which estate tax was paid
which is in excess of the fair market value of the land at decedent's death.
53. See Appendix.
54. Id.
55. See notes 89-93 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of unfavorable
leases.
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Assume, for example, that the tenant is in a financially weak position or
that the lease terms allow the tenant to sublet and terminate his obligations
under the lease without the lessor's consent. Under such circumstances a
lease should probably be evaluated at a greater discount than the current
market rate.56 Case 557 presents this situation. Though the market rate
of return has dropped from six to five percent, the lease, made at six
percent, should nonetheless contain premium value and be discounted
at six percent since the lessor's position is financially weak and risky.
Thus, the lease has no premium value because of its own peculiar
characteristics. Of course, the opposite may be true. If the lease in
question justifies a lower risk factor than the average market return on
unencumbered land, the lease has premium value.
It was noted earlier5" that the presence of lessee-built improvements
with an expected useful life shorter than the lease term is only significant
to C as security " for payment of the ground rents under the lease and that
the security may add value to the lease contract. This situation is best
illustrated by Case 8,60 in which the market value of the land is $100,000,
and the market rate of return on similar unimproved and unencumbered
land is six percent. Neither the market value nor the rate of return has
varied since the lease was executed. Thus, if the land were unimproved
the lease would have no premium value. But the presence of a lessee-
constructed building decreases the risk. It is unlikely that B will jeopardize
his investment in the building by failing to pay the rentals due under the
lease. Consequently, a lower rate of discount, five percent, is applied in
measuring the value of C's investment and the existence of a premium
value in the lease becomes apparent.
It should be noted that in Case 8 the useful life of the building at the
time of C's purchase is thirty years. Since the lease term has forty years
remaining, the risk involved during the last ten years of the term is
probably greater. This can be reflected by assigning different risk factors
56. It is arguable that the lease, regardless of its below average strength, should
not be discounted at more than the going market rate of return on unencumbered land,
since presumably if the lease were broken by the lessee the land could be leased at the
market rate of return. This argument, however, overlooks reality. A lease with a bad
tenant may cause serious financial difficulties before repossession and reletting of the
premises can be accomplished, e.g., irregular payments, legal expense incurred in oust-
ing the tenant and loss of rent while ousting the old tenant and obtaining a new one.
57. See Appendix.
58. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
59. See First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951), where
the court stated that the building "stands primarily as security for the lessee's perform-
ance of covenants." Id. at 71.
60. See Appendix.
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to the various periods of the lease"' or, as in Case 8, by considering such
factors in the overall rate applied.
Following the suggestion of the court of appeals, the Tax Court in
Moore appeared to take varying risk factors62 into consideration on
remand. Despite the Ninth Circuit's incisive modification of the "incident
to the fee" doctrine in Moore, the Tax Court persisted in its application,
first by dodging the Moore opinion"3 and thereafter by flatly rejecting
it.6 Though the appellate courts have avoided ruling directly on the
"incident to the fee" doctrine, since Moore they have consistently upheld
the Tax Court's denial of amortization of the premium rentals and have
shown great reluctance to accept the Ninth Circuit's view as articulated
in Moore.
In Schubert v. Commissioner5 the Fourth Circuit, in affirming the
Tax Court's denial of amortization, apparently relied upon the "no
exhaustion" doctrine.66 However, the court took the position that in the
fact situation presented any evidence introduced to establish premium
value in the lease "could be founded on nothing more than guess, specula-
tion and conjecture."6 7
The statement of the court is even more significant since the record
apparently contained substantial evidence that the lease provided for
annual premium rentals of approximately $3,000 to $4,0006s during the
remaining nineteen years of the term. In Moore, the circuit court
admitted, perhaps as the result of a faulty hypothesis,69 that allocations of
61. For example, the investment can be discounted at 4 3/4 percent for the first
thirty years and at 5 3/4 percent for the last ten years after the building's expected
useful life has expired.
62. Some of the factors considered were the life of the building and the remaining
life of the sub-lease from the lessee to the present occupant of the building.
63. Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954). The Tax Court's refusal to
allow amortization of the value of premium rental was not proven and may well be justified
under the facts of that case. The court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's determina-
tion. 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1956).
64. World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 7 (1960); Schubert v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960). In Schubert, the Tax Court indicated its lack of appre-
ciation of the capital nature of the premium rentals bought and paid for by the purchaser:
If the purchaser would be entitled to isolate the lease from the fee and take de-
ductions for the favorable portion of the lease, it would mean some of the rents
reserved in the lease would escape ordinary income tax altogether.
33 T.C. at 1053. Of course, such rents would escape ordinary income tax only because
they represent a return of capital to C.
65. 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 906 (1961).
66. See notes 77-88 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "no ex-
haustion" doctrine.
67. 286 F.2d at 583.
68. The lease called for net rentals of $11,120 annually for the next 4 1/2 years and
$11,870 annually for the following 15 years. The petitioner introduced evidence that the
fair rental value of the land at the time of her inheritance was $7,700 per year.
69. In one of the few unsound comments in the opinion the circuit court said: "If
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value to premium rentals may be speculative, but nevertheless reached the
conclusion that the allocation should be made."0 The Schubert decision,
however, does not seem to involve much speculation and approaches the
position that any attempt to allocate value to premium rentals is too
conjectural. While the court in World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner"'
did not flatly repudiate Moore, it characterized the taxpayer's wasting
asset as depreciation of the lessee-built improvements and affirmed the
Tax Court's disallowance of a deduction for amortization of premium
rentals. The court noted that the deduction was "not particularly urged"7
by the taxpayer on appeal.
In the only other case involving a taxpayer's right to amortize
premium rentals,7" a district court and the court of appeals denied
relief to the taxpayer. Both courts held that the question could not be
considered, since the taxpayer did not indicate his grounds for a deduction
when he filed a refund claim with the Commissioner.' Moore,"5 with
minor exceptions, presents the proper tax treatment in these situations.
On remand, however, the Tax Court failed to translate the value of the
wasting asset into a proportion of the basis. To the extent that the value
of the rentals provided under the lease contract exceed the value of the
rentals obtainable from the land at the time of acquisition, they are not
"incident to the fee" and should be depreciable as a wasting asset.
Since they are intangible assets, the straight line basis of depreciation
should be used.
the terms of the lease could be renewed at any time on the same terms, there would be
no exhaustion or wasting . . . and no occasion for depreciation or amortization." 207
F.2d at 277. Thus, the court hypothesized, even if the lease called for rentals over and
above the present fair rental value of the land, if the fair rental value of the land at
the termination of the lease would be as great as the lease rentals, there would be no
wasting. It was primarily directed toward the difficulty of determining the fair rental
value of the land at the end of the term that the court made its comment about the
"speculative" nature of determining the value of the premium rentals. The court's quoted
comment at the beginning of this footnote is an erroneous interpretation of the nature of
the depreciation deduction, as the Tax Court pointed out on remand.
70. That such allocations are somewhat speculative does not prevent their be-
ing made. . . . As stated in Bryant v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 103, 105:
"In such cases though it be impossible to reach a certain conclusion, it has been
several times held that the Board should exercise a sound judgment, though
taking all chances against the taxpayer. . . . We are quite aware that the result
will be speculative but the Treasury will be protected and some relief is juster
than the denial of all."
207 F.2d at 278.
71. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
72. Id. at 620.
73. Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd per curiam,
266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959).
74. Apparently the taxpayer, in his claim for a refund, relied entirely on depre-
ciation of the lessee-constructed building.
75. 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 24
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 726 (1955).
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"No Exhaustion" Doctrine
The "no exhaustion" doctrine is a first cousin of the "incident to
the fee" doctrine, though the denial of amortization of premium rentals
has been couched in the former terms less frequently. The doctrine was
initially applied in Friend v. Commissioner."8 The court stated:
[A]n allowance for exhaustion obtains only where exhaus-
tion actually exists. . . . There is no showing here that the
[rental] value of the . . . premises . . . at the expiration of the
leases will be any less than it was upon the dates of the
execution of the leases."
Even the court in Moore took the position that if the fair rental value
at the end of the term would be equal to the value provided by the lease,
there would be no exhaustion and no wasting premium value even
though the rents obtainable when the taxpayer inherited the property
were much lower.' The fallacy in this position was pointed out in
Rubin's article.
It is sometimes suggested that depreciation of a lease
should be denied on the ground that, since it cannot be shown
that the rent obtainable after the lease expires will be less than
that paid under the lease., there is no certain or fixed loss caused
by the gradual exhaustion of the lease. This contention mis-
construes the function of amortization or depreciation. They are
essentially methods of tax-free recovery of cost; although value
may be relevant in determining basis, it is thereafter immaterial.
Thus depreciation of a building is allowed to the full extent of
its basis without regard to replacement cost or to whether the
total value of the property will be any less after expiration of
the useful life of the building. Likewise it is no objection to
amortization of the cost of a contract that an equally favorable
contract may be available after it expires."'
On remand in Moore, the Tax Court correctly took the position
that although none of the witnesses could estimate the fair rental value
of the property at the end of the lease, the premium value of the lease
was nevertheless ascertainable. Noting that the rentals obtainable at
at the end of the lease had no relation to the rights acquired by the
taxpayer-heir, the court determined premium value with reference to the
76. 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939).
77. Id. at 771-72.
78. 207 F.2d at 277.
79. Rubin, supra note 44, at 1142 (emphasis added).
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rents obtainable at the time of acquisition by the taxpayer."0 But in
Schubert v. Commissioner,81 the Fourth Circuit favorably quoted Moore
on this point,82 and indicated that at the termination of the lease the
taxpayer will have a rentable building on the property. Thus, the property
will have, in all probability, a greater rental value than that provided by
the lease.8"
That rentals equalling those provided in the lease may be available
at the end of the term, however, has no bearing on whether C's acquisition
contains premium rentals which constitute a wasting asset. The position
of the Tax Court on the Moore remand and that advocated by Rubin
represent the correct posture on this question.
"Depreciation of Lessee-Constructed Building" Doctrine
As previously indicated,8" when C purchases or inherits property
with a lessee-constructed building having a useful life shorter than the
lease term, there is no apparent justification for permitting C to depreciate
the building. None of the lease rentals are attributable to the building.
Even if legal title to the building is in C, he does not hold it "for the
production of income," nor does he have an economic interest in the
building.
This position is in no sense founded upon the possibility of allowing
both the lessee and purchaser-lessor to depreciate the building simultane-
ously." If each had made an investment in the building each would be
entitled to depreciation. The decisive factor is that C has not invested in
the building since it is not reasonable to assume that any part of the
purchase price was paid for improvements which will not result in a
80. The Tax Court drew this parallel:
The purchaser of a lease is not required to show that it cannot be renewed on
as favorable terms upon its termination, since the amount paid for his lease was
meant to secure a favorable rental for a determinable period of time; hence it
is amortizable during this period of time. Similarly, the purchaser of a con-
tract which entitles him to buy merchandise for a period of years at less than
the market price at the time the contract was entered into has been permitted
to amortize the cost of the contract over its term without a showing that such
merchandise will not be available on as favorable prices upon expiration of the
contract.
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 729 (emphasis added).
81. 286 F.2d 572 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 690 (1961).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 581. In Schubert, the useful life of the building extended beyond the
lease term. The court, however, found that the taxpayer had acquired no depreciable
basis in the building but seemed to take the position that such reversionary interest in
the building offset any wasting aspects of the premium ground rentals provided in the
lease.
84. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
85. See Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953); Goelet v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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present return or a future reversion. C will have an economic interest in
the building only if B forfeits his leasehold during the building's useful
life. As pointed out in First National Bank of Kansas City v. Nee,"8
"[i]t is not ordinarily the policy of the law to measure the rights of
parties to contracts upon the basis of a forfeiture, which, though con-
tractually possible, has not occurred and is neither imminent nor pro-
bable." ' Although certain eminent tax authorities"8 disagree with this
position and believe that C has acquired a depreciable interest in the
lessee-constructed building, the above analysis seems to be the best
solution.
Regardless, the issue of whether the purchaser or heir should be
permitted to depreciate the lessee-built improvements has played an
important role in the courts' consideration of these cases and is largely
responsible for obscuring the true nature of C's investment and the
correct tax treatment to be accorded him.
The initial position of the Commissioner was to allow C to depreciate
the lessee-built improvements if the useful life extended beyond the lease
term 9 and to deny depreciation if the life of the improvements was
shorter than the lease. However, in Currier v. Commissioner,"0 the first
time the issue was presented, the Tax Court did not accept the Com-
missioner's position on the latter point. The Court held that "[b]y the
end of the lease the property will be returned with a worthless building,
and petitioner's capital will have been correspondingly reduced."'" The
Court failed to consider that none of the taxpayer's capital was invested in
the building and that it produced none of the rents under the lease. The
fallacy of this approach is revealed in Pearson v. Commissioner92 where
the taxpayer inherited property subject to an unfavorable lease.
In Case 2"' the value of the land has risen from $100,000 when the
86. 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951), affg 92 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
87. 190 F.2d at 71, citing Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F.2d 220 (1st Cir.
1942) and Board of Commissioners of Mahoning County v. Young, 59 F. 96 (6th Cir.
1893).
88. See J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME., GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 45.09A (1954) ; Lurie, Depreciating Structures Bought Under Long Leases: An Ad-
venture in Blunderland, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 43 (1960).
89. See Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945); Annex Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 167 (1943). In these cases only the question of
amortization of lease rentals was in issue, not depreciation of the improvements. The
opinions reveal, however, that the Commissioner had agreed to deductions for deprecia-
tion of the buildings, apparently beginning immediately and at least in Peters, by using
the full present fair market value of the building as the criterion for allocation of its
basis.
90. 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
91. Id. at 984.
92. 13 T.C. 851 (1949).
93. See Appendix.
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lease was executed to $120,000 at the date of C's acquisition. Thus, at a
rate of six percent the unencumbered land would produce $7,200 annually
while the lease yields only $6,000. The lease. has no premium value since
the present value of the land, if unencumbered by the lease, exceeds the
value of the property with the lease. Consequently, C should not be
entitled to a depreciation deduction, regardless of the price he paid, since
he does not own a wasting asset. Another unfavorable lease situation is
presented by Case 4 in which the rate of return on real estate has gone
up since the lease was executed.
Of course a lessee-constructed building with a useful life shorter
than the lease term should not affect' C's tax treatment. Yet, the Tax
Court in Pearson allowed depreciation on the building even though the
taxpayer's capital investment would actually appreciate as the lease-free
reversion became more immediate.
While the Tax Court was allowing depreciation on the building in
Pearson, a federal district court denied a depreciation deduction in a
similar situation.95 Though the decision adds little to this discussion
since the Court's legal and factual analysis is questionable,9 6 it does
represent the first correct result.
After the Tax Court, on remand, allowed depreciation of the building
in Moore, three circuit court decisions followed which involved lease
terms that extended beyond the useful life of the lessee-built improve-
ments. The decisions were progressively enlightening.
In reversing the Tax Court in Pearson, the court of appeals found
that "the fair market value of the building alone, as distinguished from
the .. .property as a whole, was, as to ... the [taxpayer-heir,] zero," 7
and that there was no proof that the decedent's estate tax return valuation
included any interest in the building.9"
However, the Eighth Circuit in First National Bank of Kansas City
94. The building may serve as security for the lessee's obligation to pay the lease
rentals. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
95. First Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Nee, 85 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Mo. 1949),
motion for amended judgment denied, 92 F. Supp. 328 (1950), a!f'd, 190 F.2d 61 (8th
Cir. 1951).
96. The court: 1) held that under Missouri law all property strictly embraced with-
in the leasehold would be chattels real and would belong to the lessee, a determination
later challenged by the appellate court; 2) found, on the motion for amended judgment,
that the lessee's position was like that of a life tenant, and that the lessee alone was thus
entitled to depreciate the building; and 3) erroneously found that the terms of the lease
required the tenant to yield up a building at the lease's termination in as good a condition
as the building constructed by the lessee when new.
97. Commissioner v. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1951), rev'g 13 T.C. 851
(1949).
98. Id. at 75.
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v. Nee,"9 in affirming the result reached by the district court,1 0 provided
the first pithy rhetoric on the subject. The court found that the building
was neither used by the taxpayer-heir in his trade or business nor held by
him for the production of income and that consequently it did not
qualify as depreciable property under the Code.01 The Court stated:
We consider that the expression "held for the production of
income" must be understood as requiring for its applicability
that property be held by the taxpayer for the production of
income for or to him."0 2
Recognizing that property held for the production of income does not
require that income actually accrue to the taxpayer during the years in
question, the Court continued:
What matters is the taxpayer's purpose to obtain income from
it as the motive for his holding of it.
... [I]t is demonstrable ... that no income accrued to the
lessor or was intended to accrue to her or her devisees or
assigns from that structure. The lessor reserved and received,
and her successors continue to receive, rent solely from the
ground ....
The building unquestionably produces . . . income; but not
for the lessor or her successors ...
... [W]e need not . .. determine with finality the owner-
ship of the legal title to the building presently upon the land,
for that consideration is not alone decisive upon the right to
claim depreciation on the score of its deterioration. . . . The
controlling inquiry is whether, in the situation under review
regardless of who technically owns the wasting improvement, the
claimant of depreciation holds it for the production of income for
the claimant's benefit and has in it a cost basis or . . . a
substitute basis .... 103
99. 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951), aff'g 92 F. Supp. 328 (1950). Ironically, it is
also the Eighth Circuit who most recently "muddied the water" on this matter in
World Publishing Co. Iv. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
100. The court remarked: "It will be observed that our approach to, and emphasis
upon, the grounds of decision depart in some respects from the reported reasoning of
the trial judge. But we are entirely in agreement with his ruling in the action." 190
F.2d at 64.
101. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a).
102. 190 F.2d at 66.
103. Id. at 66-68.
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The Moore decision followed and was as edifying in its reversal of
the Tax Court's allowance of depreciation for the building as it was
in reversing the Court's denial of amortization of premium rentals under
the lease. The Court stated:
[T]he basis shall be the fair market value of such property
at the time of such acquisition. But "such property" is not
the... building.., it is the taxpayer's interest in that property
It is not the physical property itself, nor the title thereto,
which alone entitles the owner to claim depreciation. The statu-
tory allowance is available to him whose interest in the wasting
asset is such that he would suffer an economic loss resulting
from the deterioration and physical exhaustion as it takes place
.... We think the Commissioner is right in his statement that
"so far as the rights reserved by the lessors were concerned, the
existence of the building and its depreciation were matters of
economic indifference. Their right to receive the ground rentals
and to have possession of the property at a future time when the
building would no longer have value, was not diminished by the
physical exhaustion of the building."' 4
The introductory verse..5 suggested that the reader consider the
predicament of counsel for the petitioner in Rowan v. Commissioner'
as he prepared for his appearance before the Tax Court. Rowan was an
uncle of Mrs. Pearson, wife of the taxpayer in Pearson."7 Rowan's
inhertited interest was in the same property involved in Pearson. In
three consecutive cases,"' including Pearson, the Tax Court had held that
an heir to leased property was entitled to depreciation deductions on a
lessee-constructed building with a useful life shorter than the lease. It
had also uniformly held 0 9 that the purchaser or heir of such property was
not entitled to depreciate or amortize premium rentals obtained under
104. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1953) (footnotes
omitted).
105. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
106. 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
107. 13 T.C. 851 (1949). In Pearson, it was an interest inherited by Mrs. Pearson
that was under review, though the case was brought in her husband's name.
108. Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950) ; Pearson v. Commissioner, 13
T.C. 851 (1949) ; Currier v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
109. Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950) ; Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 435 (1947); Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
1236 (1945); Annex Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1967 (1943);
Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939).
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the lease because they were "incident to the fee." Although Pearson had
been reversed by the circuit court,1 ' the reversal was partially couched
in terms of a failure to establish a basis in the building, and Rowan's
attorney probably felt he had more complete evidence on this point. As
counsel was preparing his brief, the Ninth Circuit had not as yet rendered
the Moore decision."' Thus, no court had ever allowed depreciation or
amortization of premium rentals." 2 Obviously, the most promising ap-
proach was to seek depreciation of the building and that was the path
Rowan's attorney chose to follow.
After counsel's brief was filed, the appellate court decision in
Moore was rendered. It must have come like a bombshell to the harried
practitioner. Not only did the Moore court disallow depreciation of the
building-what Rowan's counsel had sought-but it permitted amortiza-
tion of premium rentals, relief he had not sought. Caught in this dis-
tressing position, counsel could do little more than 'stand agonizingly by
while the Tax Court denied depreciation of the building.
If the Tax Court has refused to follow the Ninth Circuit and disallow
amortization of premium rentals,"' it has almost mechanically conformed
to Moore in denying the depreciation of improvements to one who
acquires property upon which there is a lessee-constructed building,
regardless of whether the useful life of the improvements were shorter".
or longer" 5 than the lease term.
Goelet v. United States,"' however, was the first case to apply the
Moore rationale, although erroneously, to a situation where the life of
the building extended beyond the term of the lease."'
In World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 8 A leased land to B
for fifty years and B subsequently erected a building. When 28Y years
110. Commissioner v. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951), rev'g 13 T.C. 851
(1949).
111. The Tax Court in Rowan noted the fact that Moore was not reversed until
after the petitioner's brief had been filed. 22 T.C. at 872.
112. Though the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the "incident to the fee"
doctrine in Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948),
it allowed the lessee-purchaser in that case a business expense deduction in the year of
purchase. The court also observed that the status of the lessee-purchaser did not ap-
proximate that of a third party purchaser.
113. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
114. E.g., World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 7 (1960) ; Bernstein v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954).
115. E.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960).
116. 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aifd per curia,, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1959).
117. See notes 135-36 infra and accompanying text.
118. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
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remained on the lease A sold the property to C (World Publishing Co.)".9
for $700,000. It was stipulated that the remaining useful life of the
building was not greater than the unexpired term of the lease and the
court found that the fair market value of the land was $400,000 at the
time of C's purchase.
In what must be regarded as an unusually iconoclastic opinion, the
court remarked:
On these facts, uninfluenced by any decided lease cases,
it would seem clearly to follow that the taxpayer is entitled to a
deduction... for depreciation of the $300,000 portion of its...
purchase price allocable to the improvements .... The building,
as well as the land, was acquired and held by taxpayer "'for the
production of income" . . . . [T]he building is a wasting asset
and its complete exhaustion will have been effected before the
end of the lease term. The taxpayer's spreading of the wasting
portion of the purchase price over the entire remaining lease
term by the straight-line method approximated the minimal
deduction for the taxpayer. 2 '
Although all of the rentals payable during the lease term throughout the
building's useful life were for the land alone, the court did not clearly
indicate in what manner C held the building "for the production of
income." Apparently the court did not consider it illogical to assume that
part of C's purchase price was paid for a structure in which he would
never have an economic interest.
As indicated earlier,' 2 ' the opinion implied that there might be some
distinction between denying building depreciation in a purchase case, as
opposed to an inheritance case. Additional precedent was distinguished
because the lessor-purchaser held legal title to the building. These
distinctions are unconvincing since the court did not offer any reasons why
either variant should warrant differential treatment.
World Publishing has cast a new cloud of confusion over the proper
tax treatment to be dispensed to the purchaser or heir of property
acquired subject to a lease. Case 912 appears to be the proper solution to
the situation presented in World Publishing. In the only subsequent
decision which may be pertinent to this discussion, 22 World Publishing
119. The rentals remaining to be paid under the lease were: $30,000 per year for
8 1/2 years after the purchase, $32,500 annually for the following ten years and $27,500
for the last ten years of the term.
120. 299 F.2d at 617 (footnotes omitted).
121. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Appendix.
123. Wilshire Medical Properties, Inc. v. United States, 314 F.2d 333 (9th Cir.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/2
DEPRECIATION SUBJECT TO A LEASE
was followed. It is clear, however, that the decision has not been extended
and applied to inheritance cases,"' so as to permit depreciation of
lessee-built improvements to an heir of the lessor.
In the preceding sections the tax treatment accorded C involved the
acquisition of property subject to a lease, which was either unimproved or
improved by the presence of a lessee-constructed building with a useful
life shorter than the lease term. A different analysis is called for when the
lessee-built improvements have a life extending beyond the lease term.
Still another approach is necessary where the improvements are built by
the lessor prior to the execution of the lease. The purpose of this section
is to suggest the correct tax treatment in these circumstances.
LESSEE-BUILT STRUCTURE SURVIVING LEASE TERM
At the time of C's purchase in Case 10.25 forty years remain on the
lease. The expected useful life of the building is forty-five years. The
building is economically insignificant to C during the lease since no
rents are being produced. It will be of economic importance to him,
however, at the expiration of the lease, because he can use it for the
production of income during the five remaining years of its useful life.
Thus, it is logical to assume that a portion of C's purchase price was
paid for the reversionary right to the building when the lease expires.
In determining the value of the building at the end of the lease term
it would appear reasonable to assign a value which, if depreciated at the
time of C's purchase on a straight line basis, would equal the remaining
value upon the expiration of the term. Thus, in case 9 the anticipated
value of the building at the time of its reversion to C would be $40,000." '
Accordingly, the present value of the reversionary interest in the building
is $5,68 2 .
The reversionary interest in the building effects an increase in
the total value of C's purchase, since the value of the premium rentals,
1963). In a per curiam decision remanding the case to the district court, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
[W]e conclude that summary judgment is not the proper procedure to follow in
this case; that the cause should be heard, and appellant be given the opportunity
to prove, if it can, it is entitled for depreciation purposes to some allocation of
the purchase price between the land and the building.
Id. at 333-34. Apparently the cause was settled before being heard on the remand, since
there is no reported opinion of the district court.
124. Barnes v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd sub nom.
Buzzell v. United States, 326 F.2d 825 (1964) ; Currier v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 488
(1968).
125. See Appendix.
126. A building worth $360,000 with a remaining useful life of 45 years would
permit an $8,000 annual depreciation deduction. At the end of 40 years, on a straight line
basis, its value [$360,000 - (40 x $8,000)] would be $40,000.
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$17,159, and the value of the land, $100,000, remain unchanged by the
reversion in the building. However, a lower percentage of basis is
obviously being paid for the assets since a portion of the purchase price
must be attributed to the reversionary right in the building. Allocation
of basis among the various assets should be made in accordance with the
formula provided by the Regulations." 7
Since C's basis in the building will not begin to decrease until the
end of the lease term, his depreciation of the basis allocated to that
asset should be delayed until the reversion occurs. Meanwhile, his basis
in the premium rentals should be amortized over the remaining years
of the lease.
Lessor-Built Structures
It is not the purpose of this article to extensively explore the equit-
able tax treatment to be accorded C when he acquires lessor-improved
property subject to a lease; however, the matter warrants some consider-
ation at this point. Depreciation or amortization of premium rentals
resulting from lessor-constructed buildings has received scant attention
from the courts, presumably because the taxpayer, C, is permitted to
depreciate his basis in the improvements. Further, in allocating his basis
between land and improvements he is generally able to reflect any
premium value of the lease in the value of the building. Under most
circumstances C is adequately compensated by being permitted to depreci-
ate the building at an accelerated rate.
In World Publishing the court stated that it was immaterial whether
the improvements were constructed by the vendor-lessor or the tenant-
if C is entitled to depreciation in one instance he should be in the other.128
The presence of lessor-contructed improvements, however, results in an
increase in income directly attributable to the improvements and a
deduction is justified. The existence of lessee-constructed improvements
does not increase the lessor's income and consequently, a depreciation
deduction is unwarranted.
The Treasury policy of permitting C to depreciate the lessor-built
improvements does not necessarily reflect the exhaustion of C's capital
investment, since there may be a substantial amount of premium value in
the lease which is not reflected in the deduction. That would be the
result, for example, where there has been a decided decline in the value of
unimproved land subsequent to the execution of the lease.1" In such a
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (1967).
128. 35 T.C. 7 (1960).
129. Apparently this was the situation in Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236
(1945), where amortization of premium rentals was denied on the "incident to the fee"
doctrine. The building in that case was lessor-constructed.
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situation an approach similar to that outlined previously is recom-
mended.'
No difficulty is encountered when the remaining useful life of the
building coincides with the remaining term of the lease, as illustrated by
Case ll.' The amount in excess of the land's value will be "wasting"
over the identical forty year period and whether the depreciation is
attributed to the building or is labeled as premium value of the lease is of
little consequence except for C's right to accelerated depreciation.
When the remaining life of the building extends beyond the lease,
the exhaustion of C's capital assets would seem to be properly reflected
by assigning a value to the reversionary right in the building as discussed
in Case 10. Thus, the depreciation of that portion of C's basis would be
postponed until the reversion ripens, permitting the remainder of C's
basis, in excess of that attributable to the land, to be depreciated over the
remaining term of the lease. Again, it is immaterial, except for the right
to accelerated depreciation, whether the asset exhausted during the lease
is considered a structure or an intangible. The question of whether C
should be allowed accelerated depreciation on the wasting asset has been
rendered less important by the recapture provisions in the Code."'
Difficulty is encountered, however, in allocating a basis for depreciation
that will accurately reflect the exhaustion of C's investment where the
remaining useful life of the building, at the time of C's purchase, falls
short of the unexpired lease.
This result occurs because the allocation of basis formula uses the
value of the expected lease rentals as an element of total value. The
valuation of the lease rentals for the remaining term is inaccurate since it
presupposes the existence of a building for the production of a portion of
the rentals throughout the lease term. This, of course, is not the case
since C theoretically will have to make an investment in another building
when the useful life of the existing structure expires.
Without attempting to offer a final solution to this problem,1 '
it is suggested that an inflated basis must be allocated to the wasting
assets which will reflect not only C's present investment, but also the
investment he will have to make at the end of the present building's
useful life to produce rentals to the end of the lease term. Once the wasting
basis is ascertained it would be allocated to the building in the same
proportion that the present fair market value of the building bears to the
value of the total rents to be received under the lease.
130. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
131. See Appendix.
132. ITrr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1250.
133. This problem is one which has never arisen in the courts.
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As previously noted,13 4 in the decade between the Moore and World
Publishing decisions, the courts consistently held that one who acquired
lessee-improved property was not entitled to depreciate those improve-
ments. Although Moore was directed at cases where the useful life of the
improvements was shorter than the lease term, the courts applied the rule
with equal vigor when the useful life exceeded the lease term. In Goelet
v. United States.3 the useful life of the improvements at the time of the
taxpayer's acquisition of the property extended eight years beyond the
term of the lease. The district court did not mention this distinction in
denying the depreciation deduction and the appellate court deemed the
fact unimportant in its per curiam affirmance of the lower court's
decision.13
In Schubert, both the Tax Court and the court of appeals followed
Goelet without questioning the correctness of applying the Moore doctrine
to improvements that would outlive the lease. After the taxpayer in
World Publishing was permitted to depreciate improvements with a
useful life "not in excess" of the lease term, the anomaly of existing law
became clear--one who purchases or inherits leased property containing
lessee-built improvements with a useful life shorter than the lease term
may depreciate those improvements; one who acquires such property
where the life of the improvements extend beyond the lease term may
not depreciate the improvemnts.
Obviously, where the useful life of the building exceeds the lease
term, the taxpayer should be permitted to assign a present value to the
reversionary right in the building and allocate his basis to the land, the
premium rentals and the reversion. The basis of the reversion should be
depreciated over the remaining life of the building when the reversion
ripens and the basis of the premium rentals should be amortized over
the lease term.
The tax consequence to one who acquires leased property with
lessor-constructed improvements has received scant attention by the
courts. Peters v. Commissioner.7 is the only case where the taxpayer
sought amortization of the premium rentals under such circumstances.
Relying on the "incident to the fee" doctrine, the court incorrectly denied
taxpayer's claim. Of course, in these circumstances the Commissioner
134. See notes 111-17 supra and accompanying text.
135. 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'g 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
136. 266 F.2d at 882. In Goelet the taxpayer acquired the property by inheritance
in 1941, when there were thirty-two years remaining on the lease term and the building
had an unused life of forty years. In 1946, prior to the case being heard, the lease was
extended for ten years. This, however, had no bearing on the nature of the taxpayer's
"investment" at the time of her acquisition in 1941.
137. 4 T.C. 1236 (1945).
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permits depreciation of the basis allocable to the building. The taxpayers
have probably not sought to enlarge their depreciable basis to include
premium rentals, since there may be a risk of losing the accelerated rate.
CON'CLUSION
Where C purchases or inherits unimproved property subject to a
lease or property having lessee-constructed improvements with an expected
useful life shorter than the remaining lease term, he should be permitted
to amortize that portion of his basis allocable to the premium rentals
receivable under the lease-those rentals in excess of the fair rental value
of the land, unencumbered by the lease at the time of acquisition. C should
not be entitled to a depreciation deduction on a lessee-built structure that
will not survive the lease term, since he does not hold it for the production
of rental income during the lease term or have a reversionary interest
in the building.
An equitable tax treatment of C has eluded the courts in these
circumstances. The taxpayers and their counsel must share the respon-
sibility for this situation with the judiciary.'3 8 They can scarcely be
faulted for their approach, however, in view of the judicial precedents
with which they were faced.
The court of appeals decision in Moore is the apex of judicial
insight. Only the failure of the Tax Court to allocate a basis to the
wasting asset in accordance with the formula provided by the Regulations
prevented a proper result from being reached on remand. The steady
regression to the earlier Tax Court view allowing depreciation of
lessee-built structures and denying amortization of premium rentals
culminated in the World Publishing decision in the Eighth Circuit.
Recent decisions are even more perplexing. In Goelet and Schubert
depreciation was not allowed on buildings that would survive the lease
term, while in World Publishing depreciation was allowed on a structure
with a useful life shorter than the remaining term of the lease.
It would appear that the only safe course for tax counsel to pursue
in the present chaotic state of the law is alternative relief: amortization
of the basis allocable to premium rentals and depreciation of the basis
allocable to the reversion in the building, the latter to be taken when the
reversion ripens; or depreciation of the basis allocable to the building,
based upon the ratio of the present value of the building to total value.
Where the expected useful life of the lessee-built structure exceeds the
lease term, C should be required to allocate a portion of his basis to the
138. Typically the taxpayers sought only depreciation of the lessee-built improve-
ments without seeking amortization of the premium rentals.
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reversionary interest in the building and take a depreciation deduction on
that portion of his basis when the reversion ripens. Meanwhile, the basis
allocable to premium rentals should be depreciated during the lease term.
It is hoped that by these alternative positions counsel can faciltiate
the development of an enlightened rationale in these cases while pro-
tecting his client's position regardless of which variegated precedent the
court might choose to follow.
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